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United Kingdom of Great Britain v. Boeing Co.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Arbitration Act (F.A.A.)2 provides arbitration agreements with
the validity and enforceability afforded other contracts under the law. The F.A.A.
does this by vesting the United States district courts with the authority to compel
parties to arbitrate according to their agreements. However, when a court must
decidewhetherto consolidate separate arbitrationproceedingsbecausethey involve
common questions of fact and law and common parties, the F.A.A. is silent as to
the court's authority. This silence has resulted in courts either allowing
consolidation under a liberal interpretation of the act ("liberal construction"
approach), or refraining from granting consolidation under traditional contract
principles ("contractarian" approach). With its decision in Boeing, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals has provided a strong argument in favor of the
"contractarian" approach, and further, one that is consistent with the holdings of
other circuits addressing this procedural issue.
II. FACTS AND HOLDINo
In Great Britain v. Boeing,3 the Ministry of Defense, a branch of the
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain [hereinafter United
Kingdom], filed separate Demands for Arbitration with the American Arbitration
Association (AAA) against both the Boeing Company (Boeing) and Textron, Inc.
(Textron).4 The arbitration proceedings initiated by the United Kingdom arose
from losses incurred when a military helicopter, owned by the United Kingdom,
1. 998 F.2d 68 (2nd Cir. 1993).
2. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1988).
3. 998 F.2d 68.
4. Id at 69.
1
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was damaged during a ground test on a newly installed fuel injection system.'
Boeing manufactured the helicopter and installed the fuel injection system, while
Textron manufactured the helicopter's engine and designed the fuel injection
system.6
All military projects undertaken by Boeing and Textron for the United
Kingdom were executed under separate contracts governing long-standing
relationships between the parties.' The respective arbitration agreements relevant
to this case were contained in a 1981 Boeing-United Kingdom base contract for
services, as well as a 1985 Textron-United Kingdom contract relating to the design
and development of the fuel injection system.' Each contract contained the
following identical arbitration clause:
Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract, or
the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in New York City by
three Arbitrators in accordance with the Rules of the American
Arbitration Association, and judgment upon the award rendered by the
Arbitrator(s) may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof.9
The United Kingdom sought to consolidate the Boeing and Textron arbitration
proceedings because the proceedings were based on the same questions of fact and
law.10 Boeing, however, refused to agree to the United Kingdom's consolidation
efforts." Boeing alleged that the simplicity of the issues involved in their
arbitration proceeding, as compared to the issues involved in the Textron-United
Kingdom arbitration proceeding, would lead to undue expense.'2 The AAA held
that the consolidation of the Boeing-United Kingdom arbitration proceeding with
the Textron-United Kingdom arbitration proceeding could not occur without the
consent of all the parties involved. 3
The United Kingdom, relying on Compania Espanola de Petroleos, S.A. v.
Nereus,4 filed a petition in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York seeking to compel the consolidated arbitration proceeding










14. 527 F.2d 966 (2nd Cir. 1975) (holding that the consolidation of arbitration proceedings,
where the same questions of fact and law are involved, is authorized under the Federal Arbitration
Act and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
15. Boeing, 998 F.2d at 69.
[Vol. 1994, No. I
2
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1994, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 11
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1994/iss1/11
Separate Arbitration Proceedings
petition,16 and applying Compania, held that the F.A.A.,17 along with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,"8 authorized it to compel the consolidation of
the separate arbitration proceedings, despite a lack of agreement between the
parties, because the proceedings involved the same questions of fact and law.19
On appeal by Boeing, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit2° distinguished Compania from the case at hand2' and reversed the
district court.22 The Second Circuit held that the consolidation of arbitration
proceedings arising from separate agreements to arbitrate cannot occur without the
agreement of the parties involved, even when the proceedings involve the same
questions of fact and law.23
M. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Federal Arbitration Act2 4 generally establishes that arbitration
agreements are to be given the same legal weight afforded other privately
negotiated contracts.' Justice Relnquist articulated this principle in Volt
Information Sciences, Inc. v. Leland Stanford Junior University,26 stating that
"[t]he [F.A.A.] was designed to overrule the judiciary's long-standing refusal to
enforce agreements to arbitrate, and place such agreements upon the same footing
as other contracts. 27
Section 2 of the F.A.A. provides for the validity and enforceability of
arbitration agreements,28 while Section 4 outlines the authority that courts have
16. Id
17. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1988).
18. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a), 81(aX3).
19. Boeing, 998 F.2d at 69. The parties agreed that both of the arbitration proceedings
would be stayed pending the district court's ruling. Id Judge Stanton issued a Memorandum
Endorsement granting the United Kingdom's Petition and denying Boeing's Motion to Dismiss. Id
20. The Second Circuit's jurisdiction over the appeal was invoked through 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Boeing, 998 F.2d at 69.
21. Id at 70.
22. Id at 74.
23. Id The Second Circuit added that they were overruling Compania as it was "based on
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the 'liberal purposes' of the Federal Arbitration Act." Id
The court did not overrule Compania "to the extent it is based on the general equitable powers of
the court and principles of contract law." Id
24. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1988).
25. Boeing, 998 F.2d at 72.
26. 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
27. Id at 474.
28. Section 2 states:
A written provision in any ... contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce
to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or
transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in
writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract,
transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable, save upon such
1994]
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to compel arbitration.29 The F.A.A. is silent, however, regarding the propriety
of consolidating separate arbitration proceedings arising from common questions
of law and fact. In addressing the issue of consolidation, courts have historically
reached different conclusions and results.30 These differences can be categorized
for analysis by determining whether a court construed the F.A.A.'s purpose and
its provisions under a "liberal construction" view of the F.A.A. or under a
"contractarian" view of the F.A.A.
The leading "liberal construction" case is the Second Circuit decision
Compania Espanola de Petroleos, S.A. v. Nereus Shipping, S.A. 3' Compania
involved a maritime freight contract whereby Compania, as guarantor of a
chartererunder contract with Nereus, agreed to assume "the rights and obligations
[of the charterer] on the same terms and conditions as contained in the
[contract], 32  The district court that decided the case ordered consolidation
despite Nereus' objections.3 3 Upholding the district court ruling, the Second
Circuit, relying on its previous decision in Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire
Fabrics, Inc., 4 held that "the liberal purposes of the [F.A.A.] clearly require that
this act be interpreted so as to permit and even encourage the consolidation of
arbitration proceedings in proper cases . . . . , In Compania, all interested
parties were before the district court, the parties had "ample opportunity.. . to
express their views and present any testimonial or documentary evidence," "the
consolidation was in the interest of justice," and there were "common questions
of law and fact."3
6
The Second Circuit adhered to the belief that "any doubts as to the
construction of the [F.A.A.] ought to be resolved in line with [the F.A.A.'s] liberal
policy of promoting arbitration both to accord with the original intention of the
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
29. Section 4 states:
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate
under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district court
which, save for such an agreement, would have jurisdiction under Title 28, in a civil
action... of the subject matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between the
parties, for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for
in such agreement .... The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that
the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in
issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in
accordance with the terms of the agreement
9 U.S.C. § 4 (1988).
30. See Scott E. Blair, Note, The Struggle Over Consolidation of Arbitration Proceedings
Continues: The Eighth Circuit Chooses Sides, 1991 J. DIsP. RESOL 161, 163.
31. 527 F.2d 966 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 936 (1976). See Blair, supra note
30, at 165.
32. Compania, 527 F.2d at 969.
33. Id at 968.
34. 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959), cert dismissed per stipulation, 364 U.S. 801 (1960).
35. Compania, 527 F.2d at 975 (emphasis added).
36. Id at 974.
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parties and to help ease the current congestion of court calendars." 37 This belief
was consistent with the theory that the "overriding goal of the [F.A.A.] was to
promote the expeditious resolution of claims."3 Coupling this construction of
the F.A.A. with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Second Circuit arguably
established grounds to support the desired result of consolidation. 9
The applicability of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in arbitration
proceedings is based on Rule 81(a)(3), which states:
In proceedings under Title 9, U.S.C., relating to arbitration, or under the
Act of May 20, 1926, ch. 347, § 9 (44 Stat. 585), U.S.C., Title 45, §
159, relating to boards of arbitration of railway labor disputes, these
rules apply only to the extent that matters of procedure are not provided
for in those statutes .... 4
Because Title 9 did not provide otherwise,4" it appeared to the Second Circuit
that the "expeditious resolution of claims" could be accomplishedby consolidating
proceedings under Rule 42(a), which provides:
When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending
before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the
matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated;
and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may
tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.42
While the First Circuit, in the 1988 decision New England Energy, Inc. v.
Keystone Shipping Co.,43 appeared to also adhere to a "liberal construction" of
the F.A.A., it made a significant departure from Compania.44 In New England
Energy, the First Circuit refused to hold that Federal Rule 42(a) specifically
granted courts the power to consolidate,45 and in so doing, reversed a district
court ruling refusing to consolidate two arbitration agreements. One of the
arbitration agreements arose out of a breach of fiduciary duty between New
England Energy and Keystone as joint venturers, while the other arose from a
37. Robert Lawrence, 271 F.2d at 410.
38. Boeing, 998 F.2d at 72. See also Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 23 (1983).
39. Compania, 527 F.2d at 975; Blair, supra note 30, at 168.
40. FED. R. CIV. P. 81(a)(3).
41. See Blair, supra note 30, at 168.
42. FMD. R. CIV. P. 42(a).
43. 855 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1988). But cf Seguro de Servico de Salud de Puerto Rico v.
McAuto Systems Group, Inc., 878 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1989) (refusing to compel consolidation of
separate arbitration proceedings because the costs of consolidation outweighed the benefits to be
achieved from consolidation).
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question regarding the proper rate of hire between a ship operator and the joint
venture."6 The district court interpreted the F.A.A. and Supreme Court precedent
as not authorizing consolidation absent any express agreement between the
parties.4' The First Circuit, in reversing, held that the consolidation could occur
pursuant to Massachusetts law without violating the F.A.A .4  The court
concluded that "neither the [F.A.A.] nor Supreme Court precedent mandates...
a narrowly circumscribed role for the courts [in interpreting the F.A.A.]."49 The
First Circuit failed "to see why a state should be prevented from enhancing the
efficiency of the arbitral process, so long as the state procedure does not directly
conflict with a contractual provision. "5
The majority of circuit courts determining the propriety of consolidating
separate arbitrationproceedings have departedfrom the "liberal construction" view
of the F.A.A. in Compania and New England Energy in favor of a "contractarian"
view of the Act.5 The preference for the "contractarian" view arose mainly from
the Supreme Court's holding in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd,5 2 which
stated that "the [F.A.A.] leaves no place for the exercise of discretion by a district
court, but instead mandates that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed
to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been signed."53
The Supreme Court consideredthe legislative history of the F.A.A. and held "that
the purpose behind its passage was to ensure judicial enforcement of privately
made agreements to arbitrate, 5 4 not "to promote the expeditious resolution of
claims.I5
In Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Western Seas Shipping Co.,6 the Ninth Circuit
departed from the "liberal construction" holding in Compania in favor of a
"contractarian" view of the F.A.A. Weyerhaeuser, a ship charterer, sought to
compel consolidation of two arbitration proceedings, one which arose under a
subcharter contract and another which arose under a headcharter contract.58 Both
46. Id at 3.
47. Id.
48. Id at 4-5.
49. Id at 6.
50. Id. at 7.
51. See, e.g., Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985); American
Centennial Ins. Co. v. National Casualty Co., 951 F.2d 107 (6th Cir. 1991); Baesler v. Continental
Grain Co., 900 F.2d 1193 (8th Cir. 1990); Protective Life Ins. Corp. v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins.
Corp., 873 F.2d 281 (1lth Cir. 1989); Del E. Webb Constr. v. Richardson Hosp. Authority, 823
F.2d 145 (5th Cir. 1987); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Western Seas Shipping Co., 743 F.2d 635 (9th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1061 (1984).
52. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
53. Id at 218.
54. Id. at 219.
55. Id
56. 743 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1984),
57. Id at 637.
58. Id at 636.
[Vol. 1994, No. I
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contracts contained identical arbitration clauses.59 The arbitration clauses,
however, were silent as to consolidation.' The Ninth Circuit, in declining to
follow Compania, held that its "authority under the [F.A.A.] is narrowly
circumscribed.""' According to the Ninth Circuit, the only authority granted to
a court under the F.A.A. was to "determine whether a written arbitration
agreement exists, and if it does, enforce it in accordance with its terms."'62
The Fifth Circuit signaled its departure from the "liberal construction" view
in Del E. Webb Construction v. Richardson Hospital Authority.63 Webb, a
general contractor, sought to consolidate the arbitration of separate disputes it had
with an architect and with the owner of a medical center, Richardson Hospital
Authority, arising out of the expansion and renovation of the Richardson Medical
Center.' The district court previously held that paragraph 7.9.1 of the owner-
contractor agreement required consolidation of the architect-contractor dispute.65
Paragraph 7.9.1 provided that "an arbitration action shall include the owner and
the contractor, 'and any otherpersons substantially involved in a common question
of fact or law, whose presence is required if complete relief is to be accorded in
the arbitration. "'6 The Fifth Circuit, in reversing the district court holding,
noted that the district court had ignored a portion of paragraph7 .9.1 that explicitly
excluded the architect from the arbitration absent any written consent to be
joined.6' Adhering to the "contractarian" view of the F.A.A., the Fifth Circuit
held that "under the grant of authority in § 4 [of the F.A.A.], the district court was
limited to enforcing arbitration agreements according to their terms, and since the
parties agree that the architect has not consented in writing, the district court
should not have ordered consolidation."
68
The Eleventh Circuit, focusing on the Ninth Circuit's holding in
Weyerhaeuser, established its adherence to the "contractarian" view in Protective
Life Insurance Corp. v. Lincoln National Life Insurance Corp.6 9 In Protective
Life, the district court ordered the consolidation of arbitrationproceedingsbetween
Lincoln National Life Insurance and Protective Life Insurance and between
Protective Life Insurance and a third party."° The Eleventh Circuit, in
59. Id
60. Id. at 637.
61. Id
62. Id.
63. 823 F.2d 145 (5th Cir. 1987).
64. Id at 147. The Fifth Circuit also ruled on issues concerning the applicability of the
F.A.A_ to this case and whether the district court or the arbitrator should decide the question
concerning satisfaction of contractual prerequisites of the arbitration demand. Id. at 146.




69. 873 F.2d 281 (11th Cir. 1989).
70. Id. at 282.
1994]
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overturning the district court ruling, adopted the Ninth Circuit's interpretationthat
Section 4 of the F.A.A.:
[C]omports with the statute's underlying premise that arbitration is a
creature of contract, and that '[an agreement to arbitrate before a
special tribunal is, in effect, a specializedkind of forum-selection clause
that posits not only the situs of suit but also the procedure to be used
in resolving the dispute.' 1
The Eleventh Circuit held that because the agreements between the parties
contained separate arbitration clauses that were silent as to consolidation, the three
parties had never agreed to consolidated arbitration.72 In a footnote, the court
specifically rejected Protective Life Insurance's argument that district courts have
the power to consolidate arbitration proceedings under Rules 42(a) and 81(a)(3)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
73
Finally, in Baesler v. Continental Grain Co., 74 the Eighth Circuit joined the
Ninth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits in holding that the "contractarian" view of the
F.A.A. did not give district courts the power to consolidate arbitrationproceedings
absent a provision requiring consolidation in the agreements.75 Continental Grain
was a party to several standard contracts, whereby producers purchased safflower
seed from Continental Grain and then offered the resulting crop to Continental
Grain at discounted prices.76  Although these contracts contained similar
arbitration agreements, the agreements were silent as to the propriety of
consolidation.77 After reviewing both the "liberal construction" view under
Compania and New England Energy, and the "contractarian" view under
Weyerhaeuser, Webb, and Protective Life, the Eighth Circuit stated that "[w]e
agree with the majority view that the [F.A.A.] precludes federal courts from
ordering consolidation of arbitration proceedings. The Supreme Court has
explicitly rejected the assertion that the overriding goal of the Act is to promote
the expeditious resolution of claims. 7..
71. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Weyerhaeuser, 743 F.2d at 637 (quoting Scherk v.
Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974))).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 282 n.1.
74. 900 F.2d 1193 (8th Cir. 1990).
75. Id. at 1195.
76. Id. at 1194.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1195. In his dissent, Circuit Judge John R. Brown held that the proper approach to
follow was that developed in Compania. Id. at 1196. Judge Brown believed that the courts'
proper role in the arbitration process was to support arbitration by making it more economically
feasible and efficient through holdings consistent with the "liberal construction" view. Id.
[Vol. 1994, No. 1
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IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
The Second Circuit, in the instant case, reversed the district court's decision
granting the United Kingdom's Petition to Compel Consolidated Arbitration.79
Recognizing Compania as precedent, the Second Circuit distinguished Compania
from the facts presented on the record,8° and overruled Compania insofar as it
established the "liberal construction" view of the F.A.A. as valid law.8'
According to the court, the distinguishing feature of Compania, absent in the
instant case, was that the three parties in Compania all signed a single addendum
to the original charter contract.' Whereas the parties in Compania had therefore
agreed to arbitrate according to the terms of a sole arbitration agreement, the
United Kingdom-Boeing and the United Kingdom-Textron agreements were "two
distinct agreements to arbitrate in two distinct contracts. '  Given this
distinction, the Second Circuit held that while the intent of the parties in
Compania was best effectuated by ordering a single arbitration proceeding, the
court could not make a similar determination in the instant decision without
frustrating the parties' intentions.84
Although the holding in Compania was distinguishable from Boeing on the
facts, the Second Circuit deemed it necessary to overrule the portion of
Compania's holding that required a "liberal construction" of the F.A.A.85 The
court recognized that the decisions by its companion circuits and by the Supreme
Court subsequent to Compania had "undermined [the] previous conclusion that the
FAA's 'liberal construction' and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow
[consolidation of] arbitration proceedings absent consent."'  In an effort to
comply with consistent circuit court application, the Second Circuit strictly
construed the language in Section 4 of the F.A.A. as not authorizing "consolidation
of arbitration proceedings unless doing so would be 'in accordance with the terms
of the agreement. ' "I The Second Circuit accepted the conclusion of the post-
Compania cases that "the FAA was intended merely to assure the enforcement of
privately negotiated arbitration agreements, despite possible inefficiencies created
by such enforcement. "m
The Second Circuit also ruled on the applicability of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in cases involving the consolidation of arbitration proceedings.89
The court limited the reach of Rule 81(a)(3) "to judicial proceedings that are
79. Boeing, 998 F.2d at 74.
80. Id. at 70.
81. Id. at 74.
82. Id. at 70.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 71.
86. Id.
87. Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4).
88. Id. at 72 (alteration in original).
89. Id. at 73.
19941
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before a court pursuant to U.S.C. Title 9, to the extent Title 9 does not provide
appropriate procedural rules. 90 The effect of this limitation was that "although
a district judge considering related petitions to compel arbitration can have all the
petitions heard at once pursuant to Rule 42(a), he or she could not use Rule 42(a)
to order that the underlying arbitrations, once compelled, be conducted
together."9
1
Finally, the court dismissed the United Kingdom's argument that
inefficiencies and inconsistent rulings might result from a failure to compel
consolidation of the arbitration proceedings. 92 Adhering to the "contractarian
view" of the F.A.A., the court stated that "[i]f [the] contracting parties wish to
have all disputes that arise from the same factual situation arbitrated in a single
proceeding, they can simply provide for consolidated arbitration in the arbitration
clauses to which they are a party." '93
V. COMMENT
The Supreme Court of the United States has yet to grant a writ of certiorari
on the issue of consolidation of arbitration proceedings. 94 Although an argument
exists that the issue of consolidation is "ripe for a writ of certiorari,"'95 the
"smorgasbord of circuit court decisions" '96 addressing the issue of consolidation
have adopted logical, consistent, and uniform approaches to determining the
propriety of this "predominately procedural issue."'  With the Boeing court's
abrogation of the "liberal construction" view of Compania,9 the Second Circuit
has further confirmed that consolidation of separate arbitration proceedings cannot
occur absent an agreement by the contracting parties.99 Additionally, it is
doubtful that the process of judicial review will result in an overruling of the
"contractarian" approach to consolidating separate arbitration proceedings, given
that the "contractarian" view comports with the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the federal court's limited role mandated by the F.A.A. 00
Similar to the reasoning of the other circuit courts that have adopted a
"contractarian" approach to the consolidation issue, the Second Circuit, in Boeing,
established its reasoning under the traditional contract policy of effectuating the
90. Id.
91. Id. at 73-74.
92. Id. at 74.
93. Id.
94. See New England Energy, 855 F.2d at 7. See also Blair, supra note 30, at 170.
95. See Blair, supra note 30, at 170.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Boeing, 998 F.2d at 74.
99. Id.
100. See Byrd, 470 U.S. at 218.
[Vol. 1994, No. I
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intent of the parties to an agreement.' ° Thus, most district courts today are
without authority to compel consolidation, absent an agreement by the parties to
consolidate separate arbitration proceedings.' °2 District courts are also without
discretion to consider the existence of common questions of fact or law °3 or
policy considerations such as judicial efficiency and the avoidance of inconsistent
deterninations.'0 4
The desired result of the Second Circuit's decision in Boeing was to place all
arbitration proceedings "upon the same footing as other contracts."'0' It can be
argued, however, that the intentions of the parties to separate arbitration
agreements would not be frustrated if consolidation was ordered by a district court
in order to avoid inefficiencies and inconsistent determinations where common
questions of fact or law exist. 0 6 Although federal courts are reluctant to extend
their authority under Title 9 of the F.A.A. beyond compelling parties to arbitrate
in accordance with an agreement,'0 7 specialists in the arbitration field do not
necessarily share the federal courts' reluctance.0" As long as exigent factors are
present, such as a common party to separate arbitration proceedings, similarity in
the issues presented to the arbitrator, and the absence of risk of prejudice to the
other parties, consolidation may be a proper method to avoid the risks of
piecemeal litigation.0 9 Federal courts would need not return to the "liberal
construction" view of the F.A.A. that appears to have been abandoned."0
Instead, a federal court could consider these exigent factors, while still effectuating
the intentions of the parties, as required under the "contractarian" view of the
101. Boeing, 998 F.2d at 70.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 74.
105. Boeing, 998 F.2d at 72 (quoting HR- REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924)).
106. "The arbitrators' decision in [Compania] held that 'the court did not err in
consolidation of two separate arbitrations which have common issues of law and fact and issues so
intertwined and overlapping that separate arbitration could have caused great and irreparable
injustice." F.B. MacKellar, To Consolidate or Not to Consolidate: A Study of Federal Court
Decisions, ARB. J., Dec. 1989, at 15, 22 (emphasis added).
107. See Boeing, 998 F.2d at 72 (citing cases decided by the Supreme Court that undermine
the decision in Compania).
108. It has been stated that:
Two or more separate arbitration proceedings may be ordered to be consolidated by
the Courts when at least one party is common to the arbitrations to be held and the
issues are substantially the same, as long as no substantial right of a party is prejudiced
by the consolidation. Thus, for example, where two contracts containing broad
arbitration clauses have different provisions as to the amount of goods and the price,
but where the same witnesses would be called and the same testimony heard by the
same persons in each proceeding, the arbitrations may be consolidated.
MAI M DOMKE, DOiMK ON COMMERCIAL ARBIRATION (THE LAW AND PRACTECE OF
COMMERCIAL ARBImAnoN), § 27.02, at 413-17 (Gabriel M. Wilner ed., rev. ed. 1988).
109. Boeing, 998 F.2d 68. See generally DOMKXE supra note 108.
110. See cases cited, supra note 51. See generally Boeing, 998 F.2d 68.
1994]
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F.A.A."' The court could consolidate separate arbitration proceedings as long
as there is an absence of an agreement to not consolidate, as opposed to where
there is an absence of an agreement to consolidate."'
VI. CONCLUSION
The Boeing court's adoption of the "contractarian" approach to consolidation
of separate arbitration proceedings is consistent with the holdings of other circuit
courts that have addressed the issue vis a vis the F.A.A. These holdings reveal an
effort by the courts to insure that parties entering arbitration proceedings will have
their intentions effectuated by a court in a manner similar to other contract
proceedings. They also reveal the costs associated with strictly adhering to the
parties' intentions, namely the loss of court discretion in considering policy
matters such as judicial efficiency and the avoidance of inconsistent
determinations.
MICHAEL L. DECAMP
111. See supra note 51. See generally Boeing, 998 F.2d 68.
112. See supra note 51. See generally Boeing, 998 F.2d 68.
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